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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC.
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No.

vs.

10260

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the validity of a deficiency
assessment for sales tax and the imposition of penalty and interest upon both such sales tax deficiency
and a use tax deficiency which has been paid.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
TAX COMMISSION
After formal hearing, the Tax Commission upheld the assessment of sales tax deficiency and the
penalty and interest involved herein.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Defendant seeks a judgment upholding the action of the Tax Commission in sustaining the deficiency assessment for sales tax and the penalty
and interest on both the sales tax and use tax.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees in substance with the facts
as set forth in Plaintiff's brief. However, because
of some irrelevant material in the stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties and the statement of
facts in Plaintiff's brief, the Defendant offers the
following brief statement of the facts in this case.
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation, which has as
its principal business the sale of motor vehicles and
accessories. (R. 108.) Within the same corporate
structure Plaintiff also operates a business which
retails items to the public through automatic vending machines. ( R. 86, 108.)
During the period herein, 1954 to 1962, there
was in effect Tax Commission Regulation S-74,
(Exhibit 2) which had been promulgated in 1937
( R. 181) and which reads in part as follows:
Persons operating punch boards or vend· ,
ing machines are deemed to be retailers and I
selling articles of tangible personal property i
which are disposed of in connection with ~he
opera ti on of such punch boards or vendrng !
machines.
1

3

The total receipts from the operations of
the above will be considered as the total selling
price of the tangible personal property distributed in connection with their operations
and must be reported as the amount of sales
subject to tax.
Since 1936 the law has also included the decision of this Court in the Jensen Candy Company
case, more fully discussed in Point I of this brief.
The collection of sales tax was regulated during
this time by a bracket system which has been in effect since 1950 (Exhibit 9, R. 168.)
During the time involved herein plaintiff made
certain purchases which were subject to use tax but
upon which no tax was paid. Plaintiff also made
sales through its vending machines without remitting to the Tax Commission any sales tax based on
such sales.
Subsequently, an audit was conducted by the
Tax Commission, which resulted in deficiency assessments for both use tax and sales tax. (R. 117-164.)
A 10 per cent penalty and interest at 12 per cent
per annum were also assessed on both the sales and
use tax deficiencies.
Plaintiff paid the full amount of use tax deficiency and the interest at 6 per cent which had
accrued thereon up to the time of payment. (R.
110.) Plaintiff refuses to pay the 10 per cent penalty and the additional 6 per cent interest. (R. 180.)
This leaves an amount in controversy related to
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use tax of penalty of $278.25 and interest of $862.92,
or a total amount of $1,141.17(12). (R. 116.)
Plaintiff also paid that portion of the sales tax
deficiency which represented tax on sales made from
vending machines where the cost was in excess of
10 cents per item, together with interest at 6 per
cent on such amount. (R. 110.) Plaintiff refuses to
pay the balance of the sales tax deficiency which
arose from sales made at 10 cents or less per item,
as well as the 10 per cent penalty on the total sales
tax deficiency. Plaintiff also refuses to pay the additional 6 per cent interest on that portion of the
sales tax deficiency which was paid and the 12 per
cent interest on that portion of the sales tax deficiency which remains unpaid. (R. 181.) This leaves an
amount in controversy related to sales tax of principal of $7,086.05, penalty of $1,012.98, and interest
of $3,117.57, or a total amount of $11,216.60. (R.
115.)
Thus, this Court is called upon in this case to
decide two questions :
1. Whether sales at 10 cents or less per item
are subject to sales tax.
2. Whether the disregard by the plaintiff of
the Commission's regulations and long established
case law justifies the imposition of the penalty and
interest.

ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE PROPOSED ASSESSMENT OF SALES
TAX ON SALES UNDER FOURTEEN CENTS
IS LAWFUL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Great stress was placed by the petitioner on the
fact that certain practical problems of collecting the
tax on sales of ten cents or less only serves to indicate
that the legislature could not have intended to extend the sales tax to these or similar sales. Evidence
was introduced to the effect that it would be very
costly to alter the petitioner's machinery so as to
provide for automatic tax collection, and further,
that it is unlikely that an equitable tax could ever
be assessed based upon the fact that there are no
tokens presently existing in Utah.
Assuming that these or other similar practical
difficulties exist, this issue has nevertheless been before the Utah courts on at least three occasions.
W. F. Jens en Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission,
90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629 (1936); State Tax Comrnission v. City Commission of Logan, 88 Utah 406,
54 P.2d 1197 (1936); Francom v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 11 Utah2d 164, 356 P.2d 285 (1960).
The Court has held that the solution to the problem
raised was a practical and not a legal one and that
the legislature and the Court would leave the problems of collection of such a tax to the vendor. The
Court in the Jensen Candy case found a legislative
intention to tax sales of less than 50 cents even
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though the practical problems involved therein were
greater than allegedly exist in the present case. The
Court in that case said:
The vendor has the option to collect the
tax from the vendee; that is, he may "if he
sees fit" to do so ... or he may if he sees fit
elect to pay or absorb the tax himself. 90 Utah
364, 61 P.2d 632.
In that case the plaintiff operated a confectionary at Logan City, Utah, and a stipulated set of
facts indicated that most of the sales made were in
amounts of less than 50 cents; that a large proportion of those were below 25 cents, with many of them
being 5, 10 or 15 cent sales. The plaintiff therein
classified its sales according to amounts and calculated that 30 per cent of its sales were represented
by 5 cent sales, 10 per cent by 15 cent sales, etc. The
Court found that a large percentage of the plaintiff's business was represented by these small sales
of less than 50 cents. The plaintiff there paid the
sales tax on all sales made in amounts of 50 cents
and over, and the Tax Commission then, as now '
assessed a tax on the basis of the total or aggregate
of the sales made and demanded a deficiency with
penalty and interest. The question presented to the
Court there was whether a vendor could collect a
tax on sales made by him when the sale was in an
amount of less than 50 cents. The sales tax rate at
that time was 2 per cent of the purchase price paid
or charged, and the petitioner argued that the prac·
tical effect of this requirement was that no sale of

7

less than 50 cents could be taxed because of the fact
that there were no coins small enough to provide
for such a tax. This Court said:
The Sales Tax Act imposes the tax on the
transaction. The amount of consideration involved in the sale or transaction (a sale always
involves a purchase) is the measure to which
the rate is applied.... The vendor or the person receiving the payment or consideration
upon a sale is charged under the law with the
responsibility of collecting or accounting to
the state for the tax imposed. . . . 90 Utah
362, 61 P.2d 630.
The Court then cited Section 5 of the statute,
which reads as follows :
The vendor may, if he sees fit, collect the
tax from the vendee, but in no case shall he
collect as tax an amount (without regard to
fractional parts of one cent) in excess of the
tax computed at the rates prescribed by this
act. 90 Utah 362, 61 P.2d 631.
The Court then said that this sentence, particularly the parenthetical part, was the basis of the
difference between the parties. Apparently, the
plaintiff argued that this phrase, in effect, eliminated the tax on sales involving fractional parts of
50 cents, whereas the defendant, Tax Commission,
argued that the vendor was required to pay all taxes
actually collected, and whether or not taxes were
collected, to pay the rate of the tax imposed upon the
aggregate amount of the sales involved.
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The Court made reference to the Logan City
case, wherein it was said:
It is argued that the city cannot collect
a sales tax from the consumer who purchases
electricity for a fractional part of fifty cents;
that is to say, if the bill of any consumer is,
say, forty-nine cents, no tax can be collected
thereon, and likewise, if electrical energy in
any given month is sold to a consumer in the
amount of $1.25, a sales tax of only two cents
is collectible thereon, and therefore if the city
is required to pay 2 per cent of its total sale
[sic] it will be required to pay a substantial
part of the tax out of its own funds. 90 Utah
363, 61 P.2d 631.

The Court then said that except for the subject matter of the sale the foregoing question in
the Logan City case was before it in the Jensen
Candy case, and continued:
The law declares that there is levied and
collected and paid, as to sales involved in this
case, a tax of 2 per cent of the consideration
upon every retail sale of tangible personal
property. Section 4 (a), id. The language of
the statute is clear and unambiguous and
must be given effect. No exemption is pr?·
vided for sales where the gross amounts is
less than 50 cents or where the sale involving
more than 50 cents fails to express its consideration in even units of 50 cents or dollars.
There being no exemptions, the rate of 2 per
cent of the consideration paid or charged attaches to every sale. If the sale is a 10 centf
sale, there is due to the state a tax of 1/5 o
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a cent. That no coins or currency of that particular denomination, or other fractional medium of exchange, are immediately available
is not a matter the court may consider in determining the validity of the law. It may present a practical difficulty, but not an insurmountable one, ... but certain it is that a tax
levied upon every sale within the terms of the
statute and the vendor is responsible for the
collection of it. The vendor may, "if he sees
fit," collect the tax from the vendee ... or he
may, if he sees fit, elect to pay or absorb the
tax himself. He may not within the terms of
the law require the payment of more than the
rate imposed by the statute. 90 Utah 364, 61
P.2d 631.
The identical argument presented by plaintiff
was again before this court in the Francom case
which involved sales made through automatic coin
operated machines. Although argued in the briefs,
no mention was made of that argument in the decision. Apparently the Court deemed it to be without merit. We submit that the argument is again
without merit in the present case.
Several other jurisdictions have decided this
question and upheld the tax. While some differences
exist in the statutes involved, the basic premises and
much of the reasoning are applicable in this case.
See, for example, Calvert v. Canteen Co., 371 S.W.2d
556 (Texas, 1963); Piedmont Canteen Service v.
Johnson~ 123 S.E. 2d 582 (N.C., 1962).
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Point II.
THE PLAINTIFF, AS VENDOR, IS LIABLE
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE TAX.
Plaintiff argues that "since 1937 the Utah Sales
Tax Act has placed the legal and economic burden
of the sales tax on the vendee and not on the vendor."
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 11.) The idea apparently is that
to require Plaintiff, a vendor, to pay the tax herein
is unlawful. Admittedly, the changes since the enactment of the Sales Tax Act in 1933 emphasize the
duty of the vendee to pay the tax. However, numerous cases, including a number decided since 1937
when the seemingly most significant changes in emphasis occurred, have set forth with clarity the vendor's liability with regard to sales tax. W. F. Jensen
Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359,
61 P.2d 629 (1936); State Tax Commission v. City
Commission of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197;
State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99Utah177,
100 P.2d 575 (1940); Dupler's Art Furs, Inc. v.
State Tax Commission, 108 Utah 513, 161 P.2d 788,
(1945); E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission,
109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324, (1946).
The recent case of Ralph Child Construction
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah2d 53, 362
P.2d 422 ( 1961), clearly sets forth the law in this
state on this subject:
Under our statute the seller or "vendor"
is required to collect tax from the purchaserultimate consumer and pay it to the state. The
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primary obligation to pay the tax is on the
ultimate consumer, but we have repeatedly
held that a retailer who makes a taxable sale
must pay the state even though he has failed
to collect the tax from the consumer. (Citations.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Point III.
THE PROPOSED ASSESSMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
We would like to emphasize at the outset that
in the present case the Court is not confronted with
an unusual taxing situation. The sales from the
vending machines, which are herein questioned, are
a relatively minor part of a large automobile business conducted by Plaintiff. ( R. 86, 108.) This case
can thus be viewed as the normal situation of any
business concern which may devote some portion of
its activity to the sale of goods at a price of less than
14 cents per item. While the use of vending machines
involves some regulations which may not be involved
in the case of manual sales, we submit that the basic
problems concerned herein are not different from
those faced by the majority of retailers.
!

1

' I
I
1

1
1

We also note that the constitutionality of the
sales tax under the same facts as presented herein
was upheld in the Jensen Candy case. 90 Utah 361,
61 P.2d 630.
The first argument of the Plaintiff seems to
be that the constitutional doctrine of equal protec-
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tion is violated because sales from vending machines
are treated differently and discriminatorily when
compared to sales of similarly priced items not made
through such machines, that is, manually. We suggest that the statutes and regulations make no distinction between manual and automatic sales as far
as the imposition of the tax is concerned.

1

U.C.A. 59-15-5, which deals with the collection
of sales tax, provides that "the tax as computed in
the return shall in all cases be based upon the total
sales made during the period, including both cash ;
and charge sales." This statute applies to all sales
and indicates that the total sales provide the basis '
for the amount of taxes to be paid.
i
1

1

1

Sales Tax Regulation 74 applies the statutory '
requirement to vending machines when it says in
part:
The total receipts from the operations
of the above [vending machines] will be considered as the total selling price of the
tangible personal property distributed in con·
nection with their operations and must be ;
reported as the amount of sales subject to tax. i
I

Thus, rather than making a distinction between man·'
ual sales and those made by vending machines, the I
regulation merely specifies the application of the I
statute to one particular type of sale where the~e
might otherwise be misunderstanding. We submit
that there is no distinction made in either the stat·
utes or regulations or in practice in the application
of the sales tax to manual and vending machine sales
1

1
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or to plaintiff and any other retailer in Utah. This
being so, there is no denial of equal protection of the
laws to the Plaintiff.
As a second argument Plaintiff says that it is
being deprived of its property without due process
of law because Plaintiff, as vendor, is being required
to pay a tax imposed on the vendee. We refer the
reader to Point II of our brief for authorities in support of the proposition that Plaintiff is only being
required to perform a duty imposed by statute upon
all vendors.
We are uncertain as to plaintiff's position with
regard to the bracket system. Plaintiff appears to
rely on the system in an attempt to escape the tax
(Plaintiff's brief, pp. 20, 21, 25), while at the same
time seemingly questioning it (Plaintiff's brief, p.
20). We would suggest that in relying upon the
bracket system to exempt from taxation sales under
14 cents the Plaintiff is in no position to question its
validity. If Plaintiff's position is that tokens or some
other device must be used by the Commission to facilitate collection, we suggest that the following portion of U.C.A. 59-15-5 gives the Tax Commission
discretion in the device employed and that the bracket system is reasonable and lawful:
For the purpose of more efficiently securing the payment, collection and accounting for the taxes provided for under this act,
the tax commission in its discretion, by proper rules and regulations, shall provide for the
issuance of tokens or other appropriate devices to facilitate collections; ...
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The bracket system is devised so that sales made
in the lower portion of a given bracket are slightly
overtaxed, while those sales which fall in the upper
portion of a given bracket are slightly undertaxed.
It appears to be the premise of the system that in
averaging the total sales approximately the correct
amount of tax will be collected, so as to equal the
amount required to be remitted when computed on
the total sales. See Calvert v. Canteen, 371 S.W.2d
556, 558 (Texas, 1963).
The bracket system is not the law which sets
the incidence and amount of tax. It is merely an ad·
ministrative device employed to facilitate collection
as suggested in the Jens en Candy case and authorized by the foregoing statute. (R. 168.)
In the Jensen Candy case this Court suggested
a standard by which the constitutionality of the
bracket system must be sustained:
It is also recognized that no method or
form of taxation has yet been devised that is
absolutely equal and uniform (citation). The
levy or imposition of taxes may, and is in·
tended, to approach uniformity and equalit~.
The actual collection falls short of that um·
formity and equality. 90 Utah 365, 61 P.2d
632.

We submit that the proposed assessment is
neither discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable.
Rather, the Plaintiff is being asked to pay a ~ax
levied in like manner on all vendors, the collect10n ·
1
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of which is regulated in some degree by the lawful
administrative device of a bracket system.
Point IV.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY
AND INTEREST IS PROPER.
The statutory basis for the imposition of the
penalty herein is found in U.C.A. 59-15-5, which
provides in part as follows:
Any person failing to pay any tax to the
state or any amount of tax herein required
to be paid to the state within the time required
by this act, or file any return as required by
this act, shall pay, in addition to the tax, penalties and interest as provided in Section 5915-8 hereof.
Section 59-15-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part:

I

If any part of the deficiency is due to
negligence or intentional disregard of authorized rules and regulations with knowledge
thereof, but without intent to defraud, there
shall be added the amount of $2.50 or 10 per
cent of the total amount of the deficiency
whichever amount is greater and interest in
such a case shall be collected at the rate of
1 per cent per month of the amount of such
deficiency from the time the return was due,
from the person required to file the return,
which interest and additions shall become due
and payable 10 days after notice and demand
to him by the commission.
For similar use tax provisions, see U.C.A. 5916-8, 58-16-9.
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The imposition of such penalty and interest has
been sustained by this Court on several occasions.
Ford J. Twaits Co. v. State Tax Commission, 106
Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); Dupler's Art Furs,
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 108 Utah 513, 161
P.2d 788 (1945); Ralph Child Construction Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah2d 53, 362 P.2d 422
(1961).
As was noted in the Commission's findings of
fact ( R. 181), there were in effect during the period
covered by the assessment, Tax Commission Regu- ·
lation S-7 4 and a series of cases, including the Jensen Candy case, which unambiguously imposed a
duty upon plaintiff to pay the taxes in question. The
Plaintiff also admitted that it was guilty of inadvertence in failing to pay the use tax ( R. 69). We
suggest that failure to pay the tax, in view of the
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions then in
force, "is due to negligence or intentional disregard
of authorized rules or regulations with knowledge
thereof" as required by U.C.A. 59-15-8.
Plaintiff further contends that it was denied
equal protection and due process of law in being pre- ,
vented from inquiring into the policies and practices
of the Commission with regard to the assessment
of penalties.
A careful reading of the record indicates that
Plaintiff was not denied an opportunity to investigate the policies of the Commission (R. 27-42).
Plaintiff stated at the hearing that it desired to
make such an investigation and was given an oppor1
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tunity to explain to the Commission what it intended
to prove thereby. The Chairman at the hearing indicated that the Plaintiff was free to offer any evidence relevant to the points at issue.
We believe that the record shows that Plaintiff
was attempting to enter unsupported testimony on
issues not before the Commission - issues extraneous to Plaintiff's negligence or disregard of rules
or regulations. Such irrelevant matters were properly excluded, but without prejudice to the Plaintiff
to enter any other competent evidence it had. But
Plaintiff presented no further evidence. We submit
that such procedure did not unlawfully prejudice
Plaintiff and really has no bearing on the matter
of penalty and interest.
CONCLUSION

The deficiency assessment for sales tax and the
penalty and interest on both sales and use tax are
lawful and should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
JOSEPH B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for
Defendant

